

The Significance of Russian Transit Trade for the Swedish Eastern Baltic Ports in the Seventeenth Century

by

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There exists by now a substantial literature on various aspects of Swedish relations with Muscovite Russia in the 17th century. Scholars have devoted particular attention to the evolution of Swedish commercial policy towards Russia. A long line of research initiated and largely dominated by A. Attman has shown that economic issues played a pivotal role in Sweden's dealings with her "old archenemy".¹ The "Great Eastern Program" was launched by Johan III and sought to enrich the Swedish Crown by gaining control over Russia's outlets to the Western European markets and taking a cut of what was perceived and expected to be one of the most lucrative cases of commercial exchange between core and periphery of the European economy. Given Sweden's success by the early 1620s in establishing control over much of the eastern littoral of the Baltic Sea, historians of Swedish-Russian relations have been paying increasing attention to the question of the relative importance of the Baltic ports for Russia's foreign trade, what Boris Kurts termed the *arkhangel'sko-baltiiskii vopros* (the Arkhangel'sk-Baltic problem). While the central goal of Swedish policy was to divert the bulk of Russian export trade from Arkhangel'sk to the Swedish-controlled Baltic ports of Riga, Reval (Est. Tallinn), Narva, and Nyen, the Russians did their best to promote trade via the White Sea port.

¹ On Swedish perceptions of Russia, see KARI TARKIANEN: "Vår Gamble Arffiende Ryssen": Synen på Ryssland i Sverige 1595–1621 och andra studier kring den svenska Rysslands-bilden från tidigare stormaktstid ["Our Old Archenemy Russia": Swedish Views on Russia in 1595–1621 and Other Studies on Swedish Perceptions of Russia during the Early Great-Power-Period], Uppsala 1974. Attmans most important contributions on the subject are: ARTUR ATTMAN: Den ryska marknaden i 1500-talets baltiska politik: 1558–1595 [The Russian Market in 16th-Century Baltic Politics: 1558–1595], Lund 1944; ARTUR ATTMAN: The Russian and Polish Markets in International Trade 1500–1650, Gothenburg 1973; ARTUR ATTMAN: The Struggle for Baltic Markets: Powers in Conflict, 1558–1618, Gothenburg 1979; ARTUR ATTMAN: Swedish Aspirations and the Russian Market during the 17th Century, Gothenburg 1985. The most important Russian contributions on the subject have been made by I. P. Shaskol'skii. See for example IGOR' P. SHASKOL'SKII: Stolbovskii mir 1617 g. i torgovye otnosheniia Rossii so Shvedskim gosudarstvom [The Stolbovo Peace of 1617 and Russian Commercial Relations with the Swedish State], Moscow 1964; IGOR' P. SHASKOL'SKII: Ekonomicheskie otnosheniia Rossii i Shvedskogo gosudarstva [Economic Relations of Russia and the Swedish State], St Petersburg 1998. For a recent contribution of Swedish commercial policy towards Russia, see STEFAN TROEBST: Handelskontrolle – "Derivation" – Eindämmung: Schwedische Moskaupolitik 1617–1661, Wiesbaden 1997.

While the *arkhangel'sko-baltiiskii vopros* remains to be exhaustively treated, this paper will seek to answer a different, albeit closely related question: How important were the trade flows from the Muscovite hinterland to the economy and overall export trade of the Swedish Baltic ports? Thanks to their wealth and population, they were the leading commercial centers of the Swedish *storkraft*; and geography made them the natural intermediaries of Russian transit trade through Swedish territory. In short, they stood to become the main beneficiaries from a successful implementation of the Crown's ambitious plans for Russian trade. Their story is thus important for evaluating the overall success or failure of Swedish economic policy *vis-à-vis* Russia. In addition to determining the scale of Russian transit trade in the region, this study seeks to determine the degree to which these prosperous port towns themselves depended on their Russian hinterlands. In particular, how important was the success of the Swedish *derivation* policy to their well-being – a welcome boon or a precondition for survival. A close examination of their commercial history also raises new questions about the way we view Russia's economic development in the 17th century.

The discussion will focus on the four leading Baltic ports – Riga, Reval, Narva, and Nyen – since they effectively monopolized Swedish-intermediated transit trade under the post-Stolbovo political arrangement. Viborg (Finn. Viipuri, Russ. Vyborg) largely lost its old importance to Nyen after the 1617 re-drawing of the Swedish-Russian boundary in Karelia left much of its old Russian hinterland – the western shores of Lake Ladoga – in Swedish hands.² In addition, Nyen, given its superior location in the Neva estuary, soon proved a more attractive destination for Russians from Novgorod, Tikhvin, and even Karelia. Pernau (Est. Pärnu), in spite of the Swedish government's occasional interest in according it more prominence, was separated from Muscovy by too great a distance and too many geographic obstacles for these plans to be realized, although it evidently was of some importance for Pskov's trade during the Polish period of the late 16th century.³ The only other city requiring close attention is the capital Stockholm which, during the second half of the century, became an important destination for northwest Russian boatmen. Commerce on the Stockholm route in fact constituted the only instance of active trading by Russians in the 17th century. The growing importance of Stockholm will be dis-

² A survey of Viborg's economic development in the 17th century can be found in: JOHAN W. RUUTH: *Viborgs stads historia* [A History of the City of Viborg], Helsingfors 1903, or the revised edition: J. W. RUUTH and AIMO HALILA: *Viipurin kaupungin historia* [A History of the City of Viborg], Lappeenranta 1974, pp. 111–182.

³ On Pernau's foreign trade, see HELMUT PIIRIMÄE: *Pärnu kaubanduse suurus ja koostis XVII saj. lõpul* [The Scale and Composition of Pärnu's Trade at the End of the 17th Century], in: *Tartu Riikliku Ülikooli toimetised* 223 (Eesti NSV ajaloo küsimusi) (1968), pp. 98–128. Attempts to increase Pernau's role in Russian trade are described in: ARNOLD SOOM: *Die Politik Schwedens bezüglich des russischen Transit-handels über die estnischen Städte in den Jahren 1636–1656*, Tartu 1940, pp. 235–8.

cussed in the context of Nyen, a city which all Russians had to pass through on their way to the Swedish capital.

Riga

In 1621, Riga completed Sweden's expansion on the eastern littoral of the Baltic Sea where it became the southernmost bulwark of the realm.⁴ Although the last, it was by far the most valuable of all Swedish acquisitions in the area. It was the largest city and international port in all of Sweden – surpassing even the capital Stockholm – and it completely dwarfed the other Baltic ports under Swedish control.⁵ For instance in 1653, *Portorium* customs duties collected in Riga amounted to Rtl 39775, or 71 percent of the total for Riga, Reval, Narva, and Pernau.⁶ There were a total of 875 arrivals and departures by duty-paying ships and 382 by smaller vessels, compared to a total of 485 for the other three cities. The degree of Riga's dominance declined somewhat during the second half of the century, but not sufficiently to alter the basic picture.⁷

Riga possessed some considerable advantages in Russian trade. In particular, its relative wealth of capital and wide selection of West European import wares often drew merchants from northwestern Russia there rather than to

⁴ For a more extensive survey of Riga's trade with Russia in the 17th century, see J. T. KOTILAINE: Riga's Trade with Its Muscovite Hinterland in the Seventeenth Century, in: *Journal of Baltic Studies* 31 (1999), 2, pp. 129–161.

⁵ While precise estimates are scarce, Riga's total population may have exceeded 10000 in the 17th century. In contrast, Stockholm is unlikely to have had significantly more than 8000 inhabitants. Reval's total population is likely to have been between these two figures. Narva's population was some 3300 in the middle of the century. Nyen was clearly smaller. The most generous estimates put the city's population at 2000–2500 in 1656, although the real figure is unlikely to have been much in excess of 1000. EDGARS DUNSDORFS: *Latvijas vēsture 1600–1710* [A History of Latvia 1600–1710], Stockholm 1962, p. 177; ÅKE SANDSTRÖM: *Mellan Torneå och Amsterdam: En undersökning av Stockholms roll som förmedlare av varor i regional- och utrikeshandel 1600–1650* [Between Torneå and Amsterdam: A Study of Stockholm's Role as a Mediator of Goods in Regional and Foreign trade 1600–1650], Stockholm 1990, pp. 19, 399; Tallinna ajalugu 1860-ndate aastateni [A History of Tallinn up to the 1860s], ed. by RAIMO PULLAT, Tallinn 1976, p. 263; ENN KÜNG: *Narva elanikkonna suurusel 17. sajandi keskel* [On the Size of Narva's Population in the Middle of the 17th Century], in: *Eesti Ajaloohiivi toimetised* 2 (9) (1997), pp. 39–60, here p. 50; CARL VON BONSDORFF: *Nyen och Nyenskans: Historisk skildring* [Nyen and Nyenskans: A Historical Description], in: *Acta Societatis Scientiarum Fennicae* 18 (1891), pp. 384–508, here p. 410; EDITA D. RUKHMANOVA: *Russko-shvedskaia torgovlia po nevskomu puti i gorod Kantsy* [Russian-Swedish Trade on the Neva Route and the City of Kantsy (Nyenskans)], in: *Voprosy istorii Evropeiskogo Severa* (1976), pp. 140–163, here p. 146; ANDREAS J. HIPPIG [A. I. GIPPING]: *Neva i Nienshants* [The Neva and Nyenskans], St Petersburg 1909, p. 157.

⁶ Rtl = Reichsthaler, usually worth roughly half a ruble.

⁷ HELMUT PIIRIMÄE: *Tendentsiia razvitiia i ob'em torgovli pribaltiiskich gorodov v period shvedskogo gospodstva v XVII veke* [The Evolution and Scale of Trade of the Eastern Baltic Cities during the Swedish Period in the 17th Century], in: *Skandinavskii sbornik* 5 (1964), pp. 99–115, here pp. 103, 105–6.

the smaller ports of the Estonian-Ingrian coast.⁸ This was in no small part due to the dominance of the Dutch in Riga and the consequent access to the unparalleled capital and commodity resources of Amsterdam. Over time, Riga's eastern trade tended to become institutionalized with the establishment of credit relations with Russians. The main centers of Riga's Muscovite hinterland were: (i) Pskov, the traditional focus of the operations of Riga merchants in Muscovy, and (ii) Smolensk, which was regained by Muscovy in 1654 (having been conquered by Poland-Lithuania in 1611) and whose location close to the upper reaches of the Dūna (Latv. Daugava, Belor. Dzvina, Pol. Dźwina), via the tributary Kasplia (only 15 km to the north of the city), ensured the continuation of trade with Riga under the new rulers. This trade was in fact encouraged by the tsarist government, with the preponderance of the so called "Tsar's goods" (*tsarskie tovary*) whose sale was a government monopoly.⁹

In spite of Riga's considerable assets in Muscovite trade, the city also had significant weaknesses. Most importantly, Pskov and Smolensk constituted the periphery of Riga's hinterland which primarily consisted of the Lithuanian-Belorussian lands in the Dūna valley.¹⁰ Under the circumstances, Muscovy was unlikely to ever become a central focus of Riga's commercial policy which, not surprisingly, met with at best mixed success in attracting Muscovite trade to the Dūna port. A large body of evidence suggests that trade with Russia declined to historically very low levels during the first half of the century as the Time of Troubles and protracted legalistic arguments over trade routes between Riga and Pskov hindered commerce. At the time, the attitudes of Riga's authorities and merchant community toward Muscovite trade varied between indifference and periodic efforts to revive old connections, none of which made any particular headway at least until the middle of the century when Riga briefly shared in a general diversion of Russian trade to the Baltic in the years leading up to the Second Northern War.¹¹

A clear recovery in Riga's trade with Muscovy took place during the second half of the century, both because of new policy initiatives on the part of the Swedish authorities and thanks to the Muscovite annexation of the Smolensk

⁸ GEORGS JENŠS [G. ENSH]: Moskovskoe trgovoe podvor'e v Rige v XVII veke [The Muscovite Guesthouse in Riga in the 17th Century], in: Voprosy istorii, 1947, 11, pp. 74–79, here p. 79.

⁹ GEORGS JENŠS [GEORG JENSCH]: Der Handel Rigas im 17. Jahrhundert: Ein Beitrag zur livländischen Wirtschaftsgeschichte in schwedischer Zeit, Riga 1930, p. 68.

¹⁰ STEFAN TROEBST: Stockholm und Riga als "Handelsconcurrentinnen" Archangel'sks? Zum merkantilen Hintergrund schwedischer Großmachtspolitik 1650–1700, in: Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte 48 (1993), pp. 259–294, here p. 274.

¹¹ For a review of the situation in the 1650s, see J.T. KOTILAINE: Opening a Window on Europe: Foreign Trade and Military Conquest on Russia's Western Border in the 17th Century, in: Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas 46 (1998), pp. 495–530, here p. 499 ff. The disputes over trade routes have been analyzed in detail by G. Jenšs in: [GEORG JENŠ:] Rivalry between Riga and Tartu for the trade with Pskov in the XVI and XVII centuries, in: Baltic and Scandinavian Countries 4 (1938), 2, pp. 145–54.

region. Perhaps the most important institutional development was a 1676 petition by two prominent local veterans of Russian trade, Adolf Lüders and Friedrich Wesseling, who proposed to revive Riga's trade with Russia by significantly reducing duties on Muscovite trade which they wished to monopolize. In response, Karl XI appointed the two as his agents for a period of 12 years with a *de facto* monopoly and reduced customs duties on Russian wares from six to 1½ percent.¹²

Riga also became one of the beneficiaries of a more general diversion of central Russian trade from the White Sea route to the Baltic – something observed by the head of the Pskov customs as early as 1666 – although the volumes remained quite modest until the 1690s.¹³ According to the sole surviving 17th-century customs book for Pskov, exports to Riga through the German guesthouse in 1670/1 included at least 792:2 S#¹⁴ flax and hemp sold to F. Wesseling, 28:4 S# tallow, 916.7 *pud iufti* (c. 5500 hides), and at least 5000 mats sold to Wesseling. The much less detailed data on exports by Russians through the Great Customs does not allow for precise estimates, but one can assume that the exports to Riga were more or less comparable in magnitude, given that the overall scale of export trade through the German guesthouse and the Great Customs were roughly equal.¹⁵

Surviving data on Riga's trade with the Pskov region between 1676 and 1691 points to relative stability in the scale of exchange with imports usually in the

¹² The government in fact revised the arrangement after only two years. On June 5, 1678, trade in *iufti*, furs, and silk was opened to all Riga merchants. In 1692, the King appointed Wesseling his commissar for Muscovite trade. The rate of the Oktroi duty was increased to 2½ percent with the government's share two percent. G. JENŠS [JURIS JENŠS]: Rīgas pilsētas tirdzniecība ar Pliskavu XVI un XVII gs. [The City of Riga's Trade with Pskov in the 16th and 17th Centuries], in: Izglītības Ministrijas Mēnešraksts (1937), 2, pp. 152–164, here pp. 160–2; S. TROEBST (cf. footnote 10), pp. 275–7, 279–82; RA Handel och sjöfart, vol. 17; G. JENŠS (cf. footnote 9), p. 127.

¹³ ELENA V. CHISTIAKOVA: Pskovskii torg v seredine XVII veka [Pskov's market in the middle of the 17th Century], in: Istoricheskie zapiski 34 (1950), pp. 199–235, here pp. 206–9, 217; RGADA (= Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv drevnikh aktov, Russian State Archive of Old Documents), f. 96, 1666 g., No 1, fols. 4–5.

¹⁴ S# = shippound, *Schiffpfund*, *berkovets*; 1 S# = 20 l# = 400 # = 10 *pud*.

¹⁵ Evidence from the 1670/1 Pskov customs books points to intensive relations between Pskov and Central Russia. Already in 1670/1, there were instances of substantial exports by central Russian merchants via Pskov to Riga. Two Iaroslavl' merchants took a total of R 1688 worth of various goods to there, while a group of three carried R 2104 worth of *iufti*. A Kostroma merchant K. Isaev had R 400 worth of *iufti*. ANDREI V. IURASOV: Vneshniaia torgovlia Pskova v XVII v.: Dissertatsiia na soiskanie stepeni kandidata istoricheskikh nauk [The Foreign Trade of Pskov in the 17th Century: A Dissertation for the Degree of Candidate of Historical Sciences], Moscow 1998, pp. 107–8, 110, 112; PGOIAKhMZ (= Pskovskii gosudarstvennyi ob'edinennyi istoriko-arkhitekturnyi i khudozhestvennyi muzei-zapovednik, Otdel staropечатnykh i rukopisnykh fondov, United Pskov State Historical-Architectural and Art Museum-Reserve, Department of Old Printed and Manuscript Collections), f. 608, No 397. JENŠS (cf. footnote 11), p. 160; CHISTIAKOVA (cf. footnote 13), pp. 216–8.

Rtl 30–60 000 range.¹⁶ There was a particularly clear and sustained increase in *iufti* exports which, up to the mid-1660s, had never exceeded 2000 hides a year. After this point, however, they rose to exceed 20 000 hides in the 1680s and 50 000 in the '90s.¹⁷

The re-establishment of regular trade on the Pskov route coincided with a strong recovery of trade with the Smolensk region. Significant quantities of hemp, as well as timber and some potash, were floated from Smolensk to Riga, often through the intermediation of Witebsk (Belor. Vitsebsk) merchants. Data from the surviving documents of the Riga Court for Commercial Affairs (*Wettgericht*) points to substantial shipments already in the 1650s. For example, there were over 625 S# of hemp in the summer of 1657, white and potash in the autumn of 1658, six rafts of timber, 107 last potash, 500 S# pure hemp, and 200 S# flax in May 1660. In May 1661, 16 rafts carrying timber from Porech'e reached Riga. A similar shipment, as well as two barges with hemp, followed in June 1671.¹⁸ Between September 1, 1661 and January 11, 1662, at least 680 S# of hemp, as well as 24:10 S# of tallow, reached Riga from Smolensk.¹⁹

The surviving Smolensk customs records from the 1670s underscore the importance of hemp trade with Riga. Total exports of hemp in 1673/4 amounted to 6386 S# worth R 22670:28:4.²⁰ Smaller quantities of hemp were acquired at the nearby Dorogobuzh: a 1674/5 customs record lists total exports of 353:18 S# hemp. It is thus reasonable to assume that, in a good year, over 5000 S#

¹⁶ RA Kommerskollegium: Huvudarkivet: Inkomna handlingar: Kungliga brev och remisser: Huvudserien (E I a), vol. 12: 1691, fols. 129–30; KOTILAINE (cf. footnote 4), pp. 139, 141.

¹⁷ *Iufti* were special processed oxhides, typically red in color, which were valued for their durability. They became Russia's most important export product in the second half of the century. MIKHAIL IA. VOLKOV: Remeslennoe i melkotovarnoe proizvodstvo iufti v Rossii vo vtoroi polovine XVI – pervoi polovine XVII v. [Artisan and Small-Scale Production of *Iufti* in Russia in the Second Half of the 16th and First Half of the 17th Century], in: *Istoricheskie zapiski* 42 (1973), pp. 215–252; ELISABETH HARDER-GERSDORFF: Lübeck und Hamburg im internationalen Handel mit russischem Juchtenleder der frühen Neuzeit (1650–1710), in: *Zeitschrift des Vereins für Lübeckische Geschichte und Altertumskunde* 67 (1987), pp. 91–146. On the composition of Russian export trade, see J. T. KOTILAINE: Quantifying Arkhangel'sk's Exports in the 17th Century, in: *The Journal of European Economic History* 28 (1999), 2, pp. 249–300, here pp. 257–8.

¹⁸ VASILII V. DOROSHENKO: Protokoly Rizhskogo torgovogo suda kak istochnik dlia izucheniia ekonomicheskikh sviazei Rigi s russkimi, belorusskimi i litovskimi zemliami v XVII veke [Protocols of the Riga Commercial Court as a Source for Studying Riga's Economic Ties with Russian, Belorussian, and Lithuanian Lands in the 17th Century], in: *Ekonomicheskie sviazi Pribaltiki s Rossiei: Sbornik statei* [Economic Ties of the Baltic Region with Russia: A Collection of Articles], ed. by ANATOLIUS BIRONS [Anatolii K. Biron], Riga 1968, pp. 117–145, here p. 143.

¹⁹ RGADA f. 214, stb. 1470, fols. 15–32, 39–44, 48–9; IURII V. KURSKOV: A. L. Ordins-Nashchokins – Kokneseš vaivads [A. L. Ordin-Nashchokin – the *Voevoda* of Koknese], in: *Vēstures problēmas* 2 (1958), pp. 239–261, here pp. 258–9.

²⁰ The Russian calendar year ran from September to August.

of Muscovite hemp reached Riga from the Smolensk region in the early-mid-1670s. Throughout the period, Smolensk's hemp trade was very heavily export oriented with the domestic Muscovite market as a rule accounting for less than one-third of the total value of hemp sold.²¹ Riga's hemp imports from Smolensk totaled 4663 S# worth R 17205:11:0.5 in 1675/6. Imports in 1676/7 rose to 5174 S# or over R 21317:5.5. Hemp sales at Dorogobuzh reached 685:8 S# for nearly R 2100. Less important imports from the Smolensk area included linseed and hempseed, as well as various kinds of grain.²² The final surviving Smolensk customs book covers the year 1678/9. Hemp exports during the year totaled 5240 S#, valued at R 16455:12:3.5. Relatively small quantities of linseed were also exported.²³

27 entries from the 1680s and '90s in the *Wettgericht* records on seven Smolensk merchants point to the arrival of 21 barges (= c. 4200 S#) of pure hemp, five barges of hemp seed, two barges of linseed, as well as some loads of rye.²⁴ Additional information on the Düna route in the closing years of the century is available from the so-called *Strusen-Rollen* – lists of river barges.²⁵ By the '90s, the number of vessels arriving from Muscovy appears to have been in the range of five to ten percent of the total river traffic on the lower Düna. Wares consisted mainly of hemp whose volumes reached over 7000 S# in 1699. In addition, hemp seed and linseed were carried in significant quantities. Additional quantities of Russian goods may well have been carried by vessels departing from Vitebsk and Polock (Belor. Polatsk). It appears that overall Muscovite exports of hemp on the Riga route may have exceeded 10000 S# by the end of the century. The 1698 totals of key imports on the Düna route were 13410 bundles (*Bunten*) of hemp, 74661 tn of hemp seed, and 4958 tn of linseed, which compared to 16393 bundles of hemp, 133028 tn of hemp seed, and 35108 tn linseed in 1699.²⁶

²¹ RGADA f. 145, kn. 12, ch. 1; 1675 g., stb. No. 9; K. G. МИТЯЕВ: *Oboroty i torgovye svyazi smolenskogo rynka v 70-kh godakh XVII v.* [The Turnover and Commercial Relations of the Smolensk Market in the 1670s], in: *Istoricheskie zapiski* 13 (1942), pp. 53–83, here p. 61.

²² In 1675–6, 736.5 *solianki* of linseed and 185.5 *solianki* hemp seed reached Riga. In addition, there were 640 *solianki* of rye, 1750 *solianki* of barley, and 105 *solianki* of oats. The total estimated value of the grain approached R 10000, a not insignificant figure which is unlikely to have represented the normal state of affairs, RGADA f. 145, kn. 12, ch. 1–2; 1676 g., stb. No. 19, fol. 21v, 1677 g., stb. No. 6.

²³ RGADA, f. 145, kn. 12, ch. 2.

²⁴ DOROSHENKO (cf. footnote 18), p. 141.

²⁵ The surviving records are kept at the Latvian State Historical Archive and at the Swedish National Archive. LVVA (= Latvijas valsts vēstures arhīvs, Latvian State Historical Archive), 7349–1–93; RA (= Riksarkivet, Swedish National Archive) Livonica II, vol. 342. The *Strusen* were flat and wide barges which could carry 30–40 lasts worth Rtl 100–200. JENŠS (cf. footnote 9), p. 69.

²⁶ RA Livonica II, vol. 342. Estimates of Düna shipping are provided in: KOTILAINE (cf. footnote 4), p. 152.

Riga also received naval stores from the Smolensk area whose forest resources were almost entirely controlled by the Russian Crown which relied on the labor of the local court villages. This trade had become increasingly urgent in view of the gradual exhaustion of the best timber resources of the Belorussian forests along the Düna.²⁷ The Muscovite exports primarily consisted of two types of oak timber: the *Wagenschoß* (*vanches*), which were 14–15-foot pieces used in shipbuilding and sometimes for making barrels, and *Faßholz* (*vasil'ka*), smaller 80–90-inch oak pieces used for making large barrels. Especially starting in the mid-1690s, there were also two other varieties: so-called “Dutch” timber (*Hollansch Holz*, *golenderka*) which measured 58–60 inches, and “French” timber (*Fransch Holz*, *frantsuskaia*) which came in two versions measuring 48–58 inches (“large” or double) or 38–42 inches (“small” or single).²⁸

There exist some half-dozen lists of Porech'e and Kasplia timber transported to Riga. A total of 3670 pieces *Wagenschoß* and 9900 *Faßholz* were produced in the Porech'e and Rudnia *volosti* in 1670 for export to Riga. The total sale price attained R 2195.²⁹ In 1675, four barges, containing 3168 *Wagenschoß* were for Rtl 1420 at Porech'e. In the Kasplia *volost'*, 3 barges of 2370 *Wagenschoß* were produced and sold for Rtl 1080.³⁰ In 1677, the total timber sales of the Smolensk, Velizh, Porech'e, and Kasplia districts were 7370 pieces of new *Wagenschoß*, 2880 pieces of old *Wagenschoß*, and 10260 pieces of *Faßholz*, sold for R 1404:16.³¹ In 1678, the total sales of new and old *Wagenschoß* were 6120 pieces, valued at R 1606:26:4. In addition, there were 160 pieces of *Wagenschoß* and 400 pieces of *Faßholz* from Velizh.³² In 1679–80, also some 82–168 masts were exported from Smolensk to Riga.³³ In 1692–4, four Lithuanians bought the equivalent of 4440.75 pieces of *Wagenschoß* at R 1413:–:7.5 (Rtl 2568.5).³⁴ In 1696/7, timber sales totaled the equivalent of 5666.5 pieces

²⁷ ARNOLD SOOM: Der ostbaltische Holzhandel und die Holzindustrie im 17. Jahrhundert, in: *Hansische Geschichtsblätter* 79 (1961), pp. 80–100, here pp. 82–5.

²⁸ VELTA PÄVULĀNE: Rīgas tirdzniecība ar meža materiāliem XVII–XVIII gs.: No Rīgas ekonomisko sakaru vēstures ar krievu, baltkrievu, ukraiņu un lietuviešu zemēm [Riga's Trade in Forest Products in the 17th–18th Centuries: On the History of Riga's Economic Relations with Russian, Belorussian, Ukrainian, and Lithuanian Lands], Riga 1975, p. 152. The Russian documents equate one piece of *Wagenschoß* with four pieces of *Faßholz*, or 8 pieces of Dutch timber, or 16 pieces of large French timber. RGADA, f. 145, op. 1, 1692 g., No 19, fol. 14^v.

²⁹ R = ruble. MITIAEV (cf. footnote 21), p. 60.

³⁰ RGADA, f. 145, 1675 g., tetrad' No. 14, fols. 2–6.

³¹ RGADA, f. 145, 1677 g., tetrad' No. 12, fols. 1–15.

³² RGADA, f. 145, 1678 g., tetrad' No. 14, fols. 2–9^v.

³³ Hamburg merchant and Danish royal factor Andres Butenant von Rosenbusch tried to stop these exports, since he claimed that they undermined his monopoly position (since 1680) as an exporter of Russian timber via Arkhangel'sk. The eventual results of the petition are unknown, ANDREI V. DEMKIN: *Zapadnoevropeiskie kuptsy i ikh prikazchiki v Rossii v XVII v.* [Western European Merchants and Their Agents in Russia in the 17th Century], 2. Moscow 1994, pp. 22–23.

³⁴ RGADA, f. 145, op. 1, 1692 g., No 19, fols. 1–22^v.

of *Wagenschoß* worth R 2352:19:2 (Rtl 4269.5).³⁵ In 1698/9, total timber sales from Kasplia and Porech'e to attained R 995:13:1/2 – the equivalent of 2331 pieces of *Wagenschoß*.³⁶ The evidence suggest that the productive potential of the western Russian timber industry gradually increased towards the end of the century.

The situation with potash appears to have been largely analogous to timber. In 1676, 109 barrels (323:13 S#) of potash were sent to Riga from Porech'e. In 1679, 168:9 S# of potash was sold by the Tsar's administrative office at R 880:5, presumably for export to Riga. In good years, the Tsar's profits from his Riga-oriented commercial operations in the Smolensk area reached Rtl 2–3000.³⁷

Given the limitations of the surviving source material, it is difficult to assess the relative weight of Riga's Muscovite trade with precision. We know that the *Oktroi* revenues of some hundreds of *Reichsthaler* p. a. paled in comparison to the typical annual receipts from the leading imposts: the *Lizent* (c. Rtl 100000), *Anlage* (c. Rtl 40000), and *Portorium* (c. Rtl 30000).³⁸ The total value of Riga's imports subject to the *Oktroi* duty in 1681–91 was Rtl 40888, whereas the combined exports in 1681–99 were valued at Rtl 1373000.³⁹

However, in her 1976 study on Lübeck's *Rigafahrer* Company, E. Harder-Gersdorff sought to debunk the traditional assumption that Muscovite exports had a virtually insignificant role among Riga's overall exports. Pointing to the growth in Riga's commerce with Pskov during the final decades of the century, she suggested that the Muscovite share of Riga's exports eventually reached some 15 percent. We know that the *Oktroi* receipts in 1695 totaled Rtl 1812:18 at 2 1/2 percent *ad valorem*, suggesting a total value of trade of over Rtl 72000. This compares to *Akzis* receipts in 1694 of Rtl 34605 at 1.2–5.5 percent *ad valorem*. Thus the share of Pskovian, etc. wares may indeed have reached at least five percent.⁴⁰ However, while Harder-Gersdorff probably exaggerated the significance of the Pskov trade, she largely neglected the dramatic growth in ties with Smolensk, the value of whose exports began to approach the totals for Pskov during the last decades of the century and may eventually have exceeded them.

Moreover, it is evident that the Muscovite exports were of significance in relatively few commodities, thus suggesting a greater degree of dependency on

³⁵ RGADA, f. 145, op. 1, 1696 g., No 20, fols. 1–14.

³⁶ RGADA, f. 145, op. 1, Ustiug, No 16-a, fols. 752–65.

³⁷ RGADA, f. 145, kn. 12, ch. 2, fols. 355–6, 771; V. V. DOROSHENKO: Riga i eë khinterland v XVII veke [Riga und sein Hinterland im 17. Jahrhundert], pp. 59–60.

³⁸ JENŠS (cf. footnote 8), p. 78.

³⁹ TROEBST (cf. footnote 10), p. 289.

⁴⁰ ELISABETH HARDER-GERSDORFF: Zur Frage der Lübecker Rußlandimporte durch Rigafahrer im 17. Jahrhundert, in: Zeitschrift des Vereins für Lübeckische Geschichte und Altertumskunde 56 (1976), pp. 61–75, here p. 72; RA Östersjöprovinsernas tull- och licentränskap, vol. 42; LVVA 1744–1–463.

Russia in certain areas. For instance, the quantities of Russian flax remained consistently very low and paled in comparison to Lithuanian and Belorussian flax exports. Even then, the annual average of 628 S# of Muscovite flax traded in 1676–83 accounted for six percent of the total average exports of 10 539 S#. The corresponding averages for 1684–91 are 894 S# and 16 472 S#, respectively, putting the Muscovite share at 5.4 percent.⁴¹ Russian hemp, however, was a different matter altogether. While overland hemp exports from Pskov, etc., were insignificant, increasing quantities of hemp flowed from the Smolensk area towards the end of the century. 680 S# reached Riga through the intermediation of Połock merchants in late 1661–early 1662. Surviving customs records for Smolensk show that some 4500–6400 S# of hemp p.a. was sent to Riga in 1673–9. Add to this occasionally quite significant hemp exports via Dorogobuzh and the annual total exports could exceed 7000 S#. The total hemp exports of Riga averaged some 37 290 S# p.a. in 1670–80, suggesting a Muscovite share of just under one-fifth.⁴² By the '90s, hemp imports from Muscovy were invariably in excess of 5000 S# and may have been as high as 10 000 S# p.a. The annual average of Riga's total hemp exports in 1690–9 was just short of 65 000 S# which suggests that the Muscovite share may have been close to one-sixth. The importance of this share is amplified by the fact that hemp was particularly important among Riga's exports, accounting for 37.4 percent of the city's total exports in 1678–84, 24.7 percent in 1694, and 38 percent in 1699.⁴³

Muscovite *iuft'* exports via Riga averaged 10 120 p.a. in 1676–80, 22 180 p.a. in 1681–5, and 16 640 decker p.a. in 1686–90. The three average figures accounted for 54.9, 61.7, and 58.4 percent respectively of the known total *iuft'* imports of Lübeck and the *iufti* passing the Danish Sound combined. This points, once again, to the great significance of the Riga market for particular Muscovite wares. This compares to a known total of some 450 000 *iufti* via Arkhangel'sk in 1652, 167–208 000 in 1655, and 267–333 000 in 1673. The 1673 figure would appear to offer the best point of comparison, since the year was a fairly typical one for Arkhangel'sk in the second half of the century and no major economic dislocations were reported. It is thus very likely that Riga's *iuft'* exports did not significantly exceed 15 percent of Arkhangel'sk's total even during the best years. Nonetheless, this is a significant achievement by a city whose trade relied only very secondarily on the Russian market. While Narva eventually eclipsed Riga as a *iuft'* exporter, the city retained position in this trade where the Baltic region was increasingly openly challenging the supremacy of the White Sea port. Even though *iufti* were a weighty component

⁴¹ TROEBST (cf. footnote 10), p. 284.

⁴² EDGARS DUNSDORFS: Der Außenhandel Rigas im 17. Jahrhundert, in: Pirmā Baltijas vēsturnieku konference 1937, Riga 1938, pp. 457–486, here p. 477.

⁴³ Ibidem, p. 478; VASILII V. DOROSHENKO: Torgovlia i kupechestvo Rigi v XVII veke [Riga's Trade and Merchants in the 17th Century], Riga 1985, pp. 140–1.

of Muscovite trade with Riga, they did not play a significant role in Riga's overall export trade where various animal products only accounted for 3.4 percent of the total in 1694 and eight percent in 1699. The share of *iufti* attained some relative significance only at the very end of the century.⁴⁴

The share of Muscovite exports appears to have been particularly significant in the case of potash exports. The annual average of Riga's potash exports in 1676–83 was 833 S#. The Muscovite share (even excluding the Düna route) was 321 S#, or 38.5 percent, indicating a fairly high degree of dependency, although overall the volumes traded paled in comparison to Arkhangel'sk's potash trade. In contrast, however, the relative significance of Muscovite tallow exports appears to have been relatively small. The average annual imports from Muscovy accounted for 6.1 percent of Riga's combined exports to Lübeck and past the Danish Sound in 1681–5. This share fell to 3.9 percent in 1686–90.⁴⁵ The average Muscovite imports of Riga were only 10:12 S# and 1:16 S# during the two time periods respectively. In comparison, the exports of Arkhangel'sk in 1673 were 2000 S#. Even Muscovite timber came to play an important role in Riga's export bundle. By the end of the century, Muscovy may even have supplied the majority of Riga's *Faßholz* and *Wagenschoß*, as well as at least some masts. However, large quantities of less valuable timber continued to come from Lithuania.⁴⁶

Reval

Reval was the oldest stronghold of Swedish power in the Baltic provinces, having come under Swedish control in 1561, largely in a bid to eliminate neighboring Narva's emporium status in Russian trade. The Reval Council's willingness to shift their allegiances to the new overlords was due to the devastating blow dealt by Narva's special status granted by the Russians just two years earlier. Reval did indeed regain its *ius emporii* but lost it again after the Swedish conquest of Narva in 1581. This privilege was reassigned three years later, after Reval had claimed it would "die out" if it lost its trade with Russia.⁴⁷

These initial policy reversals highlight the fact that Reval's stake in Russian trade, albeit of long standing, was based on a precarious foundation. On the one hand, the Swedes granted Reval privileges which gave it a strong legal basis for diverting Russian trade away from other Baltic ports. On the other hand, however, the Crown was often forced to recognize the inefficiency of relying exclusively on Reval as a center for Russian trade, since other ports were

⁴⁴ Ibidem, pp. 141, 285.

⁴⁵ TROEBST (cf. footnote 10), pp. 284, 287.

⁴⁶ DUNSDORFS (cf. footnote 42), pp. 482–3.

⁴⁷ ARTUR ATTMAN: Den ryska marknaden (cf. footnote 1), p. 315–8; HELMUT PIIRIMÄE in: Tallinna ajalugu (cf. footnote 5), p. 245; TLA (= Tallinna Linnaarhiiv, Tallinn City Archive), 230–1–B.h. 62.

better located from the viewpoint of meeting the overall goal of diverting Russian trade to the Baltic. No legal or political maneuvering could ultimately compensate for Reval's main handicap as far as Russian trade was concerned – its relatively unfavorable geography and lack of natural connections with the Russian hinterland, something that tended to depress trade and prompted the Swedish government in 1623 to describe the city (from the viewpoint of its potential for Muscovite trade) as a *Cadaver oder thottes Aaß*.⁴⁸

No rivers connected Reval with Muscovy, a state of affairs that created an important cost disadvantage as far as the transportation of bulky commodities was concerned. Overland trade with Novgorod was well established but expensive, and the proportion of Pskov's trade that went via Dorpat (Est. Tartu) during the first half of the century could just as easily go to Riga as to Reval. Costs could be cut by shipping goods from Novgorod and Pskov to Narva via the Luga or Peipus-Narova waterways, or from Novgorod up the Volkhov and the Neva and then on to Reval. However, the rationale of these routes relied on *de iure* advantages over Narva and Nyen which otherwise were perfectly capable themselves of transmitting these wares to foreign rather than Reval merchants. Much of Reval's commercial policy, especially in the first half of the 17th century, consequently consisted of attempts to combat the inevitable rise of its competitors by legal means. Reval's own merchants also tried to better position themselves for the new situation by establishing a presence through their agents in Narva.

Reval enjoyed a fairly large domestic hinterland and thus the bulk of the city's export trade consisted of local Estonian and Livonian agricultural products: both fibers and, in growing quantities, grain. These effectively became the city's substitute for the waning Russian trade. As early as in 1586, rye and barley accounted for one-half of the total value of Reval's exports. This share almost invariably exceeded 60 percent in the 17th century. In the early 1620s, it attained some 55 percent of the total exports, only to rise to 86.4 percent in 1640.⁴⁹ In 1651, grain accounted for 77.2 percent of the total value of exports and in 1672, the share was 82.5 percent.

Reval's Russian imports consisted mainly of flax, hemp, leather, hides, skins, tallow, and small quantities of tar and pitch.⁵⁰ The share of these commodities (as well as largely Russian wax and gloves) out of the total value of Reval's exports was 42.0 percent in 1586 and 44.4 percent in 1600. It sub-

⁴⁸ ERNST GIERLICH: Reval 1621 bis 1645: Von der Eroberung Livlands durch Gustav Adolf bis zum Frieden von Brömsebro, Bonn 1991, p. 162.

⁴⁹ WOLF-RÜDIGER RÜHE: Revals Seehandel 1617–1624, in: Zeitschrift für Ostforschung 38 (1989), 2, pp. 191–255, here p. 217; ATTMAN, Den ryska marknaden (cf. footnote 1), pp. 32–3. On regional grain trade, see also ARNOLD SOOM: Der baltische Getreidehandel im 17. Jahrhundert, Stockholm 1961.

⁵⁰ ARNOLD SOOM: Der Handel Revals im siebzehnten Jahrhundert, Wiesbaden 1969, pp. 105–12.

sequently fell to 10–45 percent, the typical variation in the 17th century being between 20 and 30 percent. Of these goods, flax was the most important, typically accounting for 10–20 percent of the total. Hides often rose to the 5–10 percent range, but every other commodity was as a rule worth less than five percent of the total value.⁵¹ Problematically for the historian, all these “Russian” goods were also either produced locally or re-exported from Finland.⁵² For example, most of Reval’s tar was undoubtedly non-Russian in origin. Similarly, there were important flax-production areas in Estonia and Livonia, most notably Fickel (Est. Vigala).

The failure of the surviving sources to *systematically* indicate Muscovite goods thus makes for an enormous identification problem. The extant customs records frequently, although by no means consistently, identify certain goods as “Russian.” However, this label is unlikely to have been attached to all Russian wares. In particular, when goods were imported via Narva or Dorpat, they frequently tended to lose their “Russian” label.⁵³ There are some surviving lists of “Muscovite” wares and, more importantly, a long-term study of the trends of Reval’s foreign trade allows us to correlate the ups and downs of trade with the vagaries of diplomatic relations. Periods when diplomatic records and anecdotal evidence point to a collapse of Russian trade with Reval reveal the minimum export levels of typically “Muscovite” goods are likely to have come from the domestic hinterland of the city. Much of the variable surplus beyond this minimum, during years of normal relations, must therefore have come from Russia. Overall, Muscovite goods probably did not account for much more than two-thirds of the share of the above listed commodities in Reval’s export, and thus the Muscovite “market share” in Reval is likely to have varied between five and 30 percent of total exports.

The best indicators of Reval’s trade with Muscovy were so called “Russian” flax and hemp, as well as *iufiti*, all of which were of Muscovite origin (Figure 1 and 2). The opening decade of the century was a time of relative bloom with annual fiber exports often in the 1500–3000 S# p. a. range, among the peaks recorded during the entire century. This reflects the relative success with which the Baltic ports had managed to restore their economic ties with northwestern Russia following the Swedish conquest of Narva in 1581. However, total fiber

⁵¹ ATTMAN, *Den ryska marknaden* (cf. footnote 1), pp. 32–3.

⁵² On trade with Finland, see for instance OTTO LIIV: *Iseloomustisi Tallinna-Soome vahelisele kaubandusele peamiselt XVII sajandi lõpul ja Eesti koloniidest Soomes* [Characterizations of Trade between Tallinn and Finland Primarily at the End of the 17th Century and of Estonian Colonies in Finland], in: *Ajalooline Ajakiri* 8 (1929), 1, pp. 1–15, 2, pp. 61–75, and ARNOLD SOOM: *Zur Geschichte des Handels zwischen Reval und Finnland im 17. Jahrhundert*, in: *Eesti Teadusliku Seltsi Rootsis Aastaraamat*, 1960–1964, 4 (1966), pp. 123–133.

⁵³ For more on this issue, see J. T. KOTILAINE: *Tallinna kaubandussidemed Moskva riigiga 17. saj. alguses* [Revals Handelsbeziehungen mit dem Moskauer Staat am Anfang des 17. Jahrhunderts], in: *Vana Tallinn* 10 (14) (1999), pp. 27–44, p. 28.




Figure 1: RA Östersjöprovinsernas tull- och licenträkenskaper, vol. 2–5, 47; EAA 1–2–764–766, 770–771, 773–774; TLA 230–1–A.g. b) 1–9, 11–16, 19, 21, 24–6, 28, 30, 33, 34, 39, 40, 42–4, 46–52, 55–57, 62–63, 69, 72, 75, 78, 80, 82, 84, 88–89, 92, 97, 100, 103, 105, 109–110, 112, 115–7; B.h. 10, 21.




Figure 2: RA Östersjöprovinsernas tull- och licenträkenskaper, vol. 2–5, 47; EAA 1–2–764–766, 770–771, 773–774; TLA 230–1–A.g. b) 1–9, 11–16, 19, 21, 24–6, 28, 30, 33, 34, 39, 40, 42–4, 46–52, 55–57, 62–63, 69, 72, 75, 78, 80, 82, 84, 88–89, 92, 97, 100, 103, 105, 109–110, 112, 115–7; R.h. 10, 21.

exports suddenly fell to around 500 S# in 1611 after links with the Russian hinterland were severed in the wake of the Swedish intervention in northwestern Russia during the Time of Troubles. The severity of the drop suggests that Reval's degree of dependency on Russia for its fibers was fairly high at the time, probably at least two-thirds. A similar decline took place in leather and hide exports, although the fall was much more gradual – extending over much of the 1610s.⁵⁴ Overall, the first decade of the century marks the peak of activity by Russian merchants in Reval. Imports by Muscovite merchants amounted to 74078:8 *Thaler* in 1609, followed by much smaller figures at 2–12000 *Thaler* in the early 1620s. In addition, imports of Russian wares via Narva were just under 6000 *Thaler* in 1609.⁵⁵ This compares to total export values of 50–200000 *Thaler* in 1617–23.

Other Russian goods were also exported from Reval in large quantities. Tallow exports peaked at 1175 S# in 1600 and nearly 640 S# in 1609 and frequently exceeded 200 S# p. a., levels seldom seen during the remainder of the century. Furs were sold every year and, although squirrels were the most numerous (numbering over 100000 in 1605), sable sales could exceed 3000, as they did in 1608.⁵⁶

A recovery in Reval's eastern trade ensued only in the 1620s, largely thanks to the famous *Zollarrende*, under which the Swedish Crown farmed out the customs of Narva, Helsingfors (Finn. Helsinki), and Borgå (Finn. Porvoo) to Reval – thus allowing the Estonian capital to effectively monopolize the foreign trade of the entire of Gulf of Finland area.⁵⁷ Viborg remained the only competitor but it largely failed to re-establish its links with Russia. *De iure*, the *Zollarrende* made Reval the intermediary of all Russian transit trade via Sweden for much of the decade, although Lübeck merchants, especially, still continued to operate in Narva and Nyen, as well. Whereas the *Arrende*, deemed a failure, was terminated in 1629, Reval's *de iure* status as a place of emporium did not change until the early 1640s.⁵⁸ This considerable lag allowed the period of relative expansion in Reval's Russian trade to continue for much of the 1630s.

⁵⁴ A more detailed examination of these developments can be found in: KOTILAINE (cf. footnote 53), pp. 27–41.

⁵⁵ EVALD BLUMFELDT: Statistilisi lisandeid Tallinna kaubaliikluse ja meresõidu ajaloole aa. 1609–1629 [Statistical Addenda on the History of Tallinn's Commerce and Shipping in 1609–1629], in: *Ajalooline ajakiri* 14 (1935) 2, pp. 49–63, here pp. 61–63.

⁵⁶ RA Östersjöprovinsernas tull- och licenträkenskaper, vol. 2–4; EAA (Eesti Ajalooarhiiv, Estonian Historical Archive), 1–2–764.

⁵⁷ For background on this, see KURT R. MELANDER: Ruotsin hallituksen ja Tallinnalaisten kauppatuumat Venäjän suhteen ynnä niistä johtuvat riidat Lübeckin kanssa vuosina 1614–43 [The Swedish Government's and Reval's Commercial Strategies for Russia and Disputes with Lübeck Caused by Them in 1614–43], in: *Historiallinen Arkisto* 16 (1900), pp. 22–62; KURT R. MELANDER: Die Revaler Zollarrende 1623–1629 und die dadurch zwischen Schweden und Lübeck hervorgerufene Mißhelligkeiten, in: *Zeitschrift des Vereins für Lübeckische Geschichte und Altertumskunde* 14 (1912), pp. 237–272; GIERLICH (cf. footnote 48), pp. 157–61; TROEBST (cf. footnote 1), pp. 128–58.

⁵⁸ GIERLICH (cf. footnote 48), pp. 162–4.

The Toll Lease provided a major stimulus to Reval's trade. Fiber exports temporarily recovered to the pre-war levels and beyond. The maximum annual totals in the late 1620s-early 1630s sometimes exceeded 5000 S#, the maximum recorded during the whole century. While there was some recovery also in leather and hide exports, it was extremely gradual and a new peak was attained only in the early 1630s and even then, the annual totals of 10–20000 hides fell far short from the 40–50000 recorded during the first decade of the century. There were years with substantial fur exports, but never at the level seen during the first decade of the century. The known peak for squirrels was over 45000 in 1624, whereas sable exports never exceeded 640 and were completely absent in most years. Nor did tallow trade recover to its former levels. The maximum recorded was 558:17 S# in 1628, but there were years with less than 100 S#.⁵⁹ Overall *Portorium* customs duty receipts peaked in 1628–9 and again in 1641, but there was no clear improvement between the two and a half decades following the beginning of the Toll Lease.⁶⁰ Advances in Russian transit trade had a positive overall impact on trade volumes, but they were dwarfed by vagaries of the grain market. Indeed, there is a strong correlation between grain exports and the total duty collections.⁶¹

Even as Reval witnessed a certain recovery in its Russian trade under the Lease, the high hopes of local and Swedish politicians remained pipe dreams. The relative successes of Reval's export trade in the 1620s and 1630s happened in large part at the expense of Narva and thus failed to bring the Crown the added revenues that had been hoped for. By the 1630s, the total fiber exports stabilized in the 1–2000 S# p. a. range, which – after a depression in the 1640s – was only passed during the 1650s' boom. Due to a combination of lower customs duties, on the one hand, and a number of supply side problems on the Russian market, on the other, Reval's trade with Muscovy experienced a dramatic upswing in the late 1640s and early 1650s. The city's leather exports more than trebled between the typical levels of the early to mid-1640s and the mid-1650s (Figure 2). The same was true for fiber exports and the peak levels of 3000 S# fell short only of the Toll Lease years during the century as a whole (Figure 1). The extent to which Reval recovered its Russian trade is further evident from a handful of lists of "Russian wares" at the Swedish National Archive.⁶² The promising developments of the mid-century came to an abrupt

⁵⁹ TLA 230–1–A. g. b) 4–9; EAA 1–2–770, 771.

⁶⁰ GIERLICH (cf. footnote 48), p. 137.

⁶¹ Ibidem, pp. 126–7.

⁶² Unfortunately, these sources do not specify what exactly fell into this category, but judging by the quantities and previous practice, they were probably Muscovite goods brought directly to Reval by Russian merchants, much like the registers of Russian wares contained in the *Pfundzoll* book of the beginning part of the century. These figures would thus still exclude goods brought by Russian merchants through other Swedish cities, e. g. Narva and Dorpat, as well as goods carried by Reval or foreign merchants operating in Russia. Nonetheless, they reveal a dramatic increase in Rus-

end with the Russian attack of 1656. Even then, data on *Portorium* receipts speaks a clear language on the secondary role that Russian trade had fallen into. The peak of Rtl 12267 in 1651 compares to a trough of Rtl 7248 in 1657, when the two countries were still at war. While this is a precipitous drop, it hardly amounts to a total collapse of trade. Indeed, *Portorium* receipts were back at Rtl 10892 by 1661.⁶³

Reval's role as transit port for Russian trade was mixed in the second half of the century. Thus in 1680, the City Council wrote to the King that trade with Russia had not met expectations, as the Russians were reluctant to "enrich the alien Swedish land".⁶⁴ In fiber trade, there was practically no increase in the second half of the century. Throughout the post-Kardis years, Reval flax and hemp exports remained below the peaks of the 1620 and '30s. Reval possessed no comparative advantage that would have allowed it to undercut Narva, which received growing quantities of flax and hemp from Pskov down the Peipus-Narova waterway. The story with leather is somewhat different, however. Leather exports at best stagnated until the 1690s, after which they increased very dramatically. The totals recorded in the late 1690s were the highest observed during the entire century. In 1697, Reval exported a total of 74804 hides, of which 38935 were *iufiti* and 21539 ox and cow hides. In 1698, the total was still 58381 with 31971 *iufiti* and 25021 ox and cow hides. By 1699, the total had already declined clearly to 28831, although it was still the higher than any known total between the mid-1650s and 1697.⁶⁵

It is difficult to evaluate the sudden boom of the closing years of the century. We do not have customs data for 1696, but we do know that the total leather exports in 1695 were just over 15000 hides, a fairly typical figure for the second half of the century as a whole. It is thus quite possible that the peak lasted for only three years and at most four. It clearly represented spillover from Narva where several Reval merchants were active anyway. It may have been caused by attempts by Reval's burghers to find a substitute for the precipitous drop in grain sales, which were particularly low in those years.⁶⁶ Whether it constituted a temporary diversion of Narva's export trade or the first indications of a new beginning of Reval's Russian transit trade, remains an unanswerable question. The downturn of 1700 was likely due to the outbreak of war and the adverse impact of the grain crisis on the financial health of Reval's burghers. However, in principle, there is no reason why spillover from the sustained structural ex-

sian trade, especially in valuable *iufiti* and furs. RA Östersjöprovinsernas tull- och li-centräräkenskaper, vol. 27.

⁶³ PIIRIMÄE (cf. footnote 7), p. 106.

⁶⁴ OTTO LIIV: Tallinna ajalugu Rootsi aja teisel poolel [A History of Tallinn in the Second Half of the Swedish Period], in: Eesti Ajalooarhiivi toimetised 1 (8) (1996), pp. 7–62, here p. 23.

⁶⁵ TLA 230–1–A. g. b) 78, 80, 82, 84, 88, 89, 92, 97 100, 103, 105, 109, 110, 112, 115–7.

⁶⁶ OTTO LIIV: Die wirtschaftliche Lage des estnischen Gebietes am Ausgang des XVII Jahrhunderts, Tartu 1935, pp. 176–8.

pansion of Narva's Russian export could not have yielded a period of prosperity for Reval also, had history turned out differently.

The relative stagnation of Russian transit trade had little impact on Reval's overall development. There was a steady expansion in overall trade volumes, as reflected by *Portorium* data. The correlation between duty collections and grain trade remained strong.⁶⁷ This came to an abrupt end in the 1690s due to the so-called Great Famine, which resulted in strict limitations on grain trade.⁶⁸

Narva

Narva, in contrast to Riga and Reval, had a comparatively small Swedish hinterland, consisting of a narrow strip of the relatively sparsely populated province of Ingria and northeastern Estonia.⁶⁹ It was thus a port whose fortunes ebbed or flowed completely with trade relations with Russia. Attman estimated that the share of Russian wares in Narva's exports was 98 percent in the late 16th century and this proportion did not fall markedly in the 17th century, in spite of more intensive agricultural production in the area.⁷⁰ This was no wonder, since the city was connected to the important centers of northwestern Russia through convenient waterways and roads. In particular, Pskov and Narva were brought together by the Narova River and Lake Peipus and the relatively low costs of water transportation made possible large-scale trade in bulky goods, especially flax and hemp. Novgorod traders could reach the city overland or via the Volkhov-Neva route, as well as the Luga River. The convenient routes allowed Narva to emerge as the leading exit point of Russian exports in the Baltic already by the beginning of the 17th century.

Narva became a Muscovite port of emporium in 1559 and quickly evolved into an international port of considerable significance. Regrettably, total export volumes during the Muscovite period are impossible to establish because of a lack of pertinent customs data. However, the Danish Sound records indicate that Narva became established as a major port by the mid-'60s, although already by the end of the decade, there was a marked decline from peak levels. Flax and hemp exports totaled 15248 S# in 1567, surpassed only by Danzig in the Baltic area. Tallow exports of 5998:10 S# in 1565 accounted for nearly 95

⁶⁷ PIIRIMÄE (cf. footnote 7), p. 106; SOOM (cf. footnote 50), p. 27.

⁶⁸ OTTO LIIV: Der wirtschaftliche Niedergang Tallinns im Jahre 1697, in: *Õpetatud Eesti Seltsi Aastaraamat* 1932 (1935), pp. 207–244.

⁶⁹ For descriptions of Ingria, see OSKAR A. FORSSTRÖM: *Kuvas Inkerinmaan oloista ruotsinvallan aikana* [A Description of the State of Ingria during the Swedish Period], vol. 1. Sortavala 1890; CARL ÖHLANDER: *Bidrag till kännedom om Ingermanlands historia och förvaltning* [Contributions to Knowledge about Ingrian History and Administration], vol. 1: 1617–1645, Uppsala 1898; SIGURD SCHARTAU: *De svenska Östersjöprovinserna vid der Stora Nordiska Krigets utbrott* [The Swedish Baltic Provinces at the Outbreak of the Great Northern War], vol. 3: Ingermanland, in: *Karolinska Förbundets Årsbok* (1926), pp. 53–74.

⁷⁰ ATTMAN, *Den ryska marknaden* (cf. footnote 1), p. 53.

percent of the total exports of the Baltic region. Wax exports in 1566 amounted to 1143 S# and there were 156370 hides and skins, 81 percent of the total for the Baltic.⁷¹

While the Swedish takeover of Narva in 1581 significantly altered the city's economic prospects, causing Russia to reorient export trade to her Arctic coast, it was not accompanied by a total collapse in Narva's export trade. Although Danish records are incomplete, comparing them with surviving customs data for Narva starting in 1583 provides a picture of considerable continuity in trade up until the second decade of the 17th century. In spite of important fluctuations year-to-year, there was a secular upward trend in Narva's total exports in the 1580s and '90s. In the best years, fiber exports could exceed 7000 S# and tallow 3000 S#. The sales of leather peaked at more than 80000 hides p. a.⁷²

Johan III was eager to leave the regulations concerning trade as they had been under the Russians so as to minimize the diversion of trade elsewhere. Similarly, the Swedes were determined to make Narva a city of emporium. As early as 1583, Pontus de la Gardie ordered that foreign merchants would not be allowed to proceed to Russia through Narva, so that Russian merchants be drawn to the port. However, the lack of capital in the city made it impossible to follow through this policy and a number of foreign merchants set up representations in Pskov for direct trade with the Russian hinterland. Trade also suffered somewhat because of the Swedish Crown's ultimately unsuccessful policy of resettling Narva with Swedes and a systematic discrimination of the Lübeckers who were viewed as the greatest threat to Narva's Swedishness.⁷³ Finally, in 1584, diplomatic efforts by Reval resulted in Narva losing its emporium status. However, although this prompted Lübeck merchants to warn the Swedish Crown of a further diversion of trade to Russia's Arctic coast, it seems to have had little impact on the extent of foreign trade at Narva.⁷⁴

A comparison of the Danish Sound records with the surviving Narva rolls suggests that Narva's trade came to depend more heavily on Lübeckers after the Swedish takeover, as the Dutch and the English oriented themselves toward Kola and the Dvina estuary. Overall, the decline in Narva's trade volumes from the Russian period may have been significantly less than 50 percent. Some diversion clearly happened also inside Russia. Wax exports at Narva declined

⁷¹ Ibidem, p. 50.

⁷² Ibidem, pp. 54–55, 310; RA Österjöprovinsernas tull- och licenträkenskaper, vol. 8–19.

⁷³ Another problem was caused by Stefan Bathory's attempts to divert Pskov's trade with Narva to Dorpat and Riga. Evidently Poles already in the early 1680s patrolled Lake Peipus and forced Russian vessels to Dorpat where they had to pay duty before proceeding further, ATTMAN, *Den ryska marknaden* (cf. footnote 1), pp. 297–298, 301, 305, 308–309, 313–314.

⁷⁴ Ibidem, pp. 318–319.

to insignificance in the 17th century. Similarly, tallow became much rarer.⁷⁵ Both goods, however, continued to be exported via the White Sea.

In the 17th century, Narva was, with some few exceptional periods, the center of Sweden's *derivation* policy, the most important intermediary of Muscovite Baltic trade. The history of Narva's trade is the most important component of the history of Russian transit trade through the Baltic and an important indicator of the overall success of Sweden's derivation policy. Russian exports continued to be dominated, as before, by fibers, leather, and tallow, although tallow declined in importance compared to the 16th century.⁷⁶ These were among the chief products of the northwestern Novgorod-Pskov region which – for cost considerations alone – tended to orient their trade to Narva rather than Arkhangel'sk throughout the 17th century. Furs were consistently present but did not tend to play a central role in the trade. In addition, there were other commodities including, towards the end of the century, growing quantities of Persian raw silk. One of the keys to the city's ultimate success as the cornerstone of the Swedish government's *derivation* policy was its ability to become the main center for intermediating growing quantities of goods from central Russia. The Persian silk trade was, by the late 1680s, diverted completely to Narva.⁷⁷

The state of surviving source material on 17th-century Narva is surprisingly good. A large number of customs books or summaries of exports have been preserved, especially from the opening years of the century and again starting in the 1640s. An accurate estimate of the majority of Narva's exports during years not covered by these records can be compiled from the Danish Sound customs data and the records of the Lübeck *Novgorodfahrer*. Put together, these two sources typically accounted for some 90 percent of Narva's total exports.

⁷⁵ Ibidem, pp. 55–56.

⁷⁶ Analyses of the composition of Narva's exports at the beginning and the end of the century can be found in: HELMUT PIIRIMÄE: O sostoianii narvskoi trgovli v nachale XVII veka [On the State of Narva's Trade at the Beginning of the 17th Century], in: Skandinavskii sbornik 11 (1966), pp. 82–110; HELMUT PIIRIMÄE: Sostav, ob'ëm i raspredelenie russkogo vyvoza v 1661–1700 gg. cherez shvedskie vladeniiia v Pribaltike na primere trgovli g. Narvy [The Composition, Scale, and Distribution of Russian Exports through Swedish Baltic Possessions in 1661–1700 on the Basis of the Example of Narva], in: Skandinavskii sbornik 5 (1962), pp. 34–94.

⁷⁷ STEFAN TROEBST: Narva und der Außenhandel Persiens im 17. Jahrhundert: Zum merkantilen Hintergrund schwedischer Großmachtspolitik, in: Die schwedischen Ostseeprovinzen Estland und Livland im 16.–18. Jahrhundert, ed. by A. LOIT and H. PIIRIMÄE, Stockholm 1993, pp. 161–78; STEFAN TROEBST: Isfahan–Moskau–Amsterdam: Zur Entstehungsgeschichte des moskauischen Transitprivilegs für die Armenische Handelskompanie in Persien (1667–1676), in: Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas 41 (1993), 2, pp. 180–209; STEFAN TROEBST: Die Kaspi-Volga-Ostsee-Route in der Handelskontrollpolitik Karls XI.: Die schwedischen Persien-Missionen von Ludwig Fabritius 1679–1700, in: Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte 54 (1998), pp. 127–204.

Time series data on fiber and leather exports clearly demonstrates the dramatically changing fortunes of Narva during the period under review. The vigorous trade of the first decade of the century, which after a break of some two decades involved also increasing quantities of trans-Sound shipping, came to an abrupt end during the Swedish intervention during the Russian Time of Troubles.⁷⁸ An unfortunate gap in the sources makes it impossible to accurately determine the evolution of Narva's trade in the 1620s. However, the Reval *Zollarrende* almost certainly kept Narva's trade at very low levels. Trans-Sound exports were minimal until 1629, when Reval's privileges came to an end and 507 S# of fibers passed the Sound. By 1631, these levels rose to 2598 S# and a new peak of 3399 S# was attained in 1638. By that time, total fiber exports already exceeded 5000 S# p.a.⁷⁹

A more sustained recovery ensued after 1643 when Narva regained its right of emporium. During the boom years preceding the Second Northern War, fiber exports at times approached 7000 S# p.a. In leather goods, there was a steady recovery to over 20000 hides p.a. in the immediate prewar years. The extent of Narva's boom is evident from customs data. Total *Portorium* receipts of Rtl 1660 in 1649 compared to Rtl 4029 in 1651 and Rtl 4894 in 1653, a near-threefold increase within four years.⁸⁰

The Second Northern War completely paralyzed Narva's export trade for a couple of years. After relations with the Russian hinterland had been normalized, however, exports very quickly recovered to attain their prewar levels. Fiber exports once again exceeded 5000 S# p.a. by the early 1660s. A gradual increase followed and the 10000 S# mark was attained by the end of the 1670s. Already in the early 1680s, export levels exceeded 20000 S# and by the end of the century they peaked at over 35000 S# (Figure 3). The expansion of fiber exports toward the end of the century relied increasingly on a diversion of trade from central Russia. The same pattern was replicated by leather exports, although the expansion was far less continuous. A local peak of some 50000 hides was attained in the early 1670s, after which export levels fell again. A robust recovery began in the late 1680s. Exports initially rose to 60000 hides p.a., although by the mid-1690s already, levels as high as over 180000 were recorded. In the 1690s, annual exports typically totaled at least 100000 hides p.a. (Figure 4)

⁷⁸ PIIRIMÄE, O sostoianii (cf. footnote 76), pp. 82–110.

⁷⁹ Tabeller over Skibsfart og Varetransport gennem Øresund 1497–1660, 2: Tabeller over Varetransporten A [Tables on Shipping and the Transportation of Goods through the Danish Sound 1497–1660: Tables on the Transportation of Goods A], ed. by NINA ELLINGER BANG, Copenhagen, Leipzig 1922; RA Östersjöprovinsernas tull- och licenträkenskaper, vol. 28.

⁸⁰ PIIRIMÄE (cf. footnote 7), p. 106.




Figure 3: RA Östersjöprovinsernas tull- och licenträkenskaper, vol. 12–19, 27, 28, 34, 43; EAA 278–1–XXIV:69, 70, 1646–1–1073–1074, 1083, 1086, 1089, 1646–2–342–349; HEINRICH J. HANSEN: Geschichte der Stadt Narva, Dorpat 1858, p. 124–5; Archiv der Hansestadt Lübeck, Archiv der Neversedfakten, Gesamtarchiv der Hansestadt Lübeck, Band 10, 1646–1–1073–1074, 1083, 1086, 1089, 1646–2–342–349.





Figure 4: RA Östersjöprovinsernas tull- och licenträkenskaper, vol. 12–19, 27, 28, 34, 43; EAA 278–1–XXIV:69, 70, 1646–1–1073–1074, 1083, 1086, 1089, 1646–2–342–349; HEINRICH J. HANSEN: *Geschichte der Stadt Narva*, Dorpat 1858, p. 124–5; Archiv der Hansestadt Lübeck, Archiv der Novgorodfahrer: Comptoirgeldbuecher; Rigsarkivet (Danish National Archive) resunds Toldkammarens Arkiv.

Figure 5. The evolution of Narva's *Portorium* receipts, 1644–96 (*Reichsthaler*)



(Source: H. PIIRIMÄE: *Tendentsiia razvitiia i obščem torgovli pribaltiiskikh gorodov v period shvedskogo gosподstva v XVII veke* [cf. footnote 7], p. 106)

Narva's experience in the 17th century thus consists largely of trying to restore the export levels of the beginning of the century, a goal that was eventually not only attained but actually overshot. Especially in leather, the city posed a formidable challenge to Arkhangel'sk. Total leather exports of the White Sea port in the early 1640s totaled 670 000 hides (of which 600 000 were buckhides), a level that will have been clearly higher than it was at the beginning of the century, whereas Narva during the first decade of the century exported as many as 150 000. The situation was reversed after the Time of Troubles. Thus in the early 1650s, Arkhangel'sk's leather exports attained over 570 000 hides, while Narva could manage at best just over 20 000. By the early 1670s, Arkhangel'sk leather exports had attained some 312 000 hides, whereas Narva at times exported over 180 000 hides. It is unlikely that Arkhangel'sk's exports significantly departed from the 3–500 000 hide range during the remainder of the century. Consequently, it is safe to assume that Narva's exports

equaled at least one-third to one-half of Arkhangel'sk's levels by the end of the century.⁸¹

Narva's spectacular rise as a Russian transit port was due to a number of factors. The city undoubtedly benefitted from lower taxes, better quality-control standards, etc.⁸² However, there were important structural factors that contributed to an increase in demand and supply alike in the course of the century. Narva's importance as a transit port received a substantial boost from the arrival of growing numbers of English merchants there. Some of them even became Narva burghers. They played an important role in stimulating trade with Russia by supplying growing quantities of tobacco, a good in considerable demand in Muscovy.⁸³ In addition, demand by local burghers grew as the port established itself. In particular, Narva developed an important timber industry and created a sizeable merchant navy at the end of the century. There is recorded evidence of 31 Narva-based sea-faring vessels in the 1680s and '90s, with their capacity ranging from 40 to 280 lasts, a total of over 4000 lasts. By the end of the century, they regularly accounted for up to one-fifth of Narva's shipping.⁸⁴ The favorable demand developments were accompanied by a steady recovery of the Russian northwest from the devastation of the Time of Troubles. Especially Novgorod, historically one of the country's leading commercial centers, underwent extensive destruction during the Swedish occupation.⁸⁵ The expansion of the northwestern Russian

⁸¹ RA Handel och sjöfart, vol. 15; Muscovitica, vol. 601; Kommerskollegium: Huvudarkivet F IV:96: Handel med Ryssland 1670-talet. For more on this, see KOTILAINE (cf. footnote 11), pp. 520–529.

⁸² On customs duties, see SOOM (cf. footnote 3), pp. 115–64. Of considerable importance for improving the reputation of the Swedish Baltic ports was the *Wrackordning* adopted in 1679, SOOM (cf. footnote 50), p. 103.

⁸³ ENN KÜNG: Inglise kaubandus Narvas 17. sajandi II poolel [English Trade in Narva in the Second Half of the 17th Century], in: Kleio: Ajaloo ajakiri (1992) 5/6, pp. 12–16; ENN KÜNG: Tubakakaubanduse reguleerimine 17. sajandil Narvas [The Regulation of Tobacco Trade in 17th-Century Narva], in: Kleio: Ajaloo ajakiri (1994) 9, pp. 3–11.

⁸⁴ ARNOLD SOOM: Narva metsakaubandus ja metsatööstus XVII sajandi lõpul [Narva's Timber Trade and Forest Industry at the End of the 17th Century], in: Ajalooline Ajakiri 19 (1940), 2, pp. 57–72; HELMUT PIIRIMÄE: Laevandus ja laevaehitus Narvas XVII sajandi lõpul [Shipping and Shipbuilding in Narva at the End of the 17th Century], in: Tartu Riikliku Ülikooli Toimetised 785 (1987), pp. 3–25.

⁸⁵ The impact was particularly severe on the Sofia Side which the document described as “deserted” (*pusta*): there were only 24 “white” houses left with a total of 25 inhabitants. In addition, there were 40 tax-paying (*tiaglye*) houses with 49 residents. In fact, even four of the tax-paying houses had only widows in residence and were thus exempted from tax payments. The impact of the war and occupation of the city was devastation and it took, not surprisingly, two decades for the city to recover to a significant degree. In 1639, 472 houses in the *posad* were inhabited. This figure had risen to 640 in 1646. RGADA, f. 96, op. 1, Stb. No 7, fol. 500; VLADIMIR A. VARENTSOV: Torgovlia i tamozhennoe upravlenie Novgoroda v XVI–XVII vekakh [Trade and Customs Administration of Novgorod in the 16th–17th Centuries], Novgorod 1996, p. 46.

economy was impressive. Customs duties collected in Pskov increased nearly four-fold between 1622/3 and 1691/2. Duty-collection in Novgorod expanded nearly nine-fold between 1630/1 and 1691/2.⁸⁶ Data on the Baltic ports suggests a further doubling in the course of the 1690s. As was seen above, this local expansion was accompanied by a growing diversion of central Russian trade to the Baltic.

Nyen

The Swedish frontier fortress of Nyenskans was built in 1611 – during the Swedish intervention in the Novgorod district – on the Okhta River in the Neva estuary next to an old Votic-Russian settlement known at the beginning of the 17th century as Nevskoe ust'e. Following the 1617 Stolbovo Peace, which left Ingria in Swedish hands, the government in Stockholm entertained particularly high hopes for their new eastern province. Such thinking did not seem entirely far-fetched, given the geography and the economic potential of the Neva waterway which connected the Baltic coast with the Novgorod region. King Gustav II Adolf told the *Riksdag* that Sweden would experience an enormous increase in her customs receipts “when the trade of all of Russia will have to pass through this province”, while War Commissar for Livonia and Ingria, E. Andersson Trana, suggested in 1626 that Nyen would allow Sweden to gain control of the transit trade with Persia, another goal of Swedish trade policy.⁸⁷

Initially, the Swedish government adopted a statist approach to encourage Nyen's development. Burghers from Sweden and Finland proper were encouraged to emigrate there to make the new town a true outpost of Swedish culture in the eastern borderlands of the realm. Attempts in the late 1620s to stimulate the growth of Nyen's trade by means of various government-sponsored companies were unsuccessful, however, and the government decided to grant Nyen a city charter in 1632 in order to create the legal and institutional preconditions for making it a center for Russian trade.⁸⁸ An economic takeoff was delayed by a number of *de iure* restrictions on its activities, however. Indeed, following Gustav II Adolf's death, the government's enthusiasm for developing Nyen seems to have diminished markedly. Foreign shipping was permitted somewhat ambiguously in 1629 and more unequivocally in 1638. In addition, various re-

⁸⁶ IURASOV (cf. footnote 15), p. 166.

⁸⁷ RUKHMANOVA (cf. footnote 5), p. 141; RAGNAR LILJEDAHL: *Svensk förvaltning i Livland 1617–1634* [Swedish Administration in Livonia in 1617–1634], Uppsala 1933, p. 474.

⁸⁸ IGOR' P. SHASKOL'SKII: *Ustanovlenie priamykh torgovykh snoshenii Rossii so Shvetsiei posle Solbovskogo mira* [The Establishment of Direct Economic Relations with Sweden after the Stolbovo Peace], in: *Srednie veki* 29 (1966), pp. 139–158, here pp. 142–6; BONSDORFF (cf. footnote 5), p. 415.

ductions in customs duties were implemented to stimulate trade in the early 1640s. For instance, the 1642 charter granted the city a full right of emporium. By 1646, Nyen was *de iure* based on an equal footing with Narva in terms of legislation regulating its trade.⁸⁹

Even as the economic potential of the new port gradually increased due to a friendlier government policy, the most important impetus to Nyen's growth was external. The Stolbovo treaty had granted Russian merchants the right to trade in Stockholm. Starting very tentatively in the 1620s, growing numbers of Novgorod, Ladoga, Tikhvin, and Olonets merchants began to undertake annual boat trips to the Swedish capital. Within less than two decades, this trade evolved into regular interaction involving dozens of Russian merchants a year. Smaller merchants formed companies with profit shares and year-round representatives in Stockholm.⁹⁰

Russian trade with Stockholm was institutionalized when the Swedish government, after considerable foot-dragging, created a temporary facility – consisting of 21 wooden huts – to serve the Russians' accommodation and storage needs by the summer of 1637.⁹¹ Already in 1638, construction began on a permanent facility, although *Ryssgården* was formally opened in Södermalm only in 1641. Initially, there were 20 permanent huts and 12 wooden ones. However, the numbers steadily increased to a total of 55 in 1649, 59 in 1651, 62 in 1652, and 74 in 1654. The whole yard was periodically rebuilt and reorganized because of recurrent fires, while Russian complaints about inadequate facilities remained legion.⁹²

There are two surviving customs books for Nyen – from 1652 and 1679 – which shed valuable light on the city's foreign trade in the second half of the century. The number of departures by Russian boats reached 27 in 1652. At the time, Russian shipping was relatively evenly concentrated in four cities. Eight of the boats came from Novgorod, seven from Tikhvin, seven from Ladoga, and six from Olonets. With the exception of one Ladoga vessel going to Åbo (Finn. Turku) – the capital of the Finnish Grand Duchy – and a Novgorod boat

⁸⁹ Sbornik dokumentov, kasaiushchikhsia istorii Nevy i Nienshantsa [A Collection of Documents Concerning the History of the Neva and Nyenskans], ed. by ANDREAS J. HIPPIG [A. I. GIPPING], Petrograd 1916, Nos. VIII, X, XIII.

⁹⁰ For a more detailed account of the history of the *Ryssgården*, see: IGOR' P. SHASKOL'SKII: Russkaia morskaiia torgovlia na Baltike v XVII v. (Torgovlia so Shvetsiei) [Russian Overseas Trade in the Baltic in the 17th Century (Trade with Sweden)], St Petersburg 1994, pp. 90–133.

⁹¹ SIGNE LANG: Stadsgården och Ryssgården [The "City Yard" and the "Russian Yard"], Stockholm 1963, pp. 8–9. The history of *Ryssgården* is reviewed, in a somewhat anecdotal fashion also in: PETR P. RUMIANTSEV: Iz proshlago russkoi pravoslavnoi tserkvi v Stokgol'me: Istoricheskii ocherk s risunkami i prilozheniiami [From the Past of the Russian Orthodox Church in Stockholm: A Historical Study with Drawings and Appendices], Berlin 1910.

⁹² LANG (cf. footnote 91), pp. 9–10; SHASKOL'SKII (cf. footnote 90), pp. 90–125.

sailing for Narva, all had Stockholm as their destination.⁹³ The customs duty payments made by Ladoga vessels (one-half of the *Portorium* duty) totaled approximately Rd 320.9, as compared Rd 254.7 for Tikhvin vessels, Rd 159.4 for Novgorod vessels, and Rd 93.2 for Olonets boats.⁹⁴ There were 32 Russian boats passing through Nyen in 1679. Twelve of these were from Novgorod, ten from Olonets, nine from Tikhvin, and one from Sermaksa. 25 of these Russian vessels were going to Stockholm, three to Åbo, two to Narva, and one all the way to Torneå (Finn. Tornio) at the northernmost tip of the Gulf of Bothnia. One Novgorod boat only visited Nyen and then turned back. The total value of goods carried by Novgorod merchants was in excess of Rd 16 100, as compared to Rd 13 920.25 carried on Tikhvin boats, Rd 10 891 exported by Olonets vessels, and Rd 1 579.5 taken by the Sermaksa vessel. Nyen's Russian hinterland grew steadily at the end of the century to encompass large segments of central Russia, as well as Russian Karelia.⁹⁵

Impressive as these totals may seem, they still represent the early stages of a dramatic expansion in Russian trading activities in Stockholm. The total of *Ryssvågen* dues (a "scales" duty on bulky goods) collected in 1675 were D 325:18 (D = *daler*), a figure that rose D 617:8 in 1679. The due receipts varied within the limits of D 369:17 and D 980:10 in the 1680s and in the 1690s they already peaked above the D 2500 mark (Figure 6).⁹⁶ Trade thus essentially tripled in the 1680s and further doubled in the 1690s, highlighting the dramatic proportions of the diversion of Russian trade to the Baltic at the end of the century.

While Nyen continued to lag behind Narva in its importance, its Russian trade did reach impressive proportions to make it the second most important transit port for Russian trade in the Baltic region. Exports of the most important categories of Russian goods by Russian boatmen were still quite modest in 1652: 119.5 S# flax and just over 290 S# hemp, 177.8 S# tallow, and 4154 *iufiti*.⁹⁷ By 1679, Nyen had established itself. While flax trade was insignificant, there were 2307.1 S# hemp, 463.85 S# tallow, and 10 880 *iufiti*.⁹⁸ The end of the century saw dramatic expansion in all categories. Sales of Russian goods at

⁹³ KARA (= Kansallisarkisto – Riksarkivet, Finnish National Archive) FR 130.

⁹⁴ Rd = *Riksdaler* = *Reichsthaler*. RA Östersjöprovinsernas tull- och licenträkenskaper, vol. 32.

⁹⁵ Peasants of the northern Karelian *Pomor'e* (White Sea coastal region) – especially from the holdings of the Solovki monastery along the Rivers Kem' and Sune – began to trade with Stockholm. These peasants included some wealthy individuals who traded in local handicrafts and primary products, e.g. Nikifor Lopintsev who in 1692 sold 3800 pud of cod, 5 pud of dried pike, 120 elk hides, tallow, nuts, etc. RGADA, f. 96, 1692 g., No 2, fols. 22–3.

⁹⁶ SSA (= Stockholms Stadsarkiv, Stockholm City Archive) Stadskamrerarens, drätselkommissionens samt drätselnämndens och dess avdelningars arkiv 1639–1921 G.I.b.

⁹⁷ In addition, there were, among other things, 3831 hides of other types of leather and 2,031 sable skins and five linings, KARA FR 130.

⁹⁸ RA Östersjöprovinsernas tull- och licenträkenskaper, vol. 32.




Figure 6. Receipts from the "Scales Duty" at Stockholm's Ryssgården (*daler*)

(Source: SSA Stadskamrerarens, drätselkommissionens samt drätselnämndens och dess avdelningars arkiv 1639–1921, G. Huvudboken och dess räkenskaper, I. Huvudböcker med verifikationer: b) Verifikationer 1636–1920)

Ryssgården in Stockholm peaked at over 1000 S# of flax, nearly 6000 S# hemp, over 1500 S# tallow, and over 16000 *iufti* in 1690s.⁹⁹

Unlike Narva, however, Nyen also disposed of a sizeable non-Russian hinterland extending deep into eastern Finland, both the shores of Lake Ladoga and the Vuoksen (Finn. Vuoksi, Russ. Vuoksa) basin. From very early on, therefore, Nyen's exports were dichotomous. In addition to a large Muscovite component, there were significant quantities of Finnish and Ingrian tar, butter, and other goods.¹⁰⁰ Nyen proved a particularly threatening competitor to Viborg, which lost much of its old hinterland to the new neighbor. Nyen was left outside the quota system of the government's Tar Companies until 1689 and, in spite of official admonitions to the contrary, was able to divert much of Ka-

⁹⁹ SSA Stadskamrerarens, drätselkommissionens samt drätselnämndens och dess avdelningars arkiv 1639–1921, G. Huvudboken och dess räkenskaper, I. Huvudböcker med verifikationer: b) Verifikationer 1636–1920: 1690, del 1, fols. 2418–699; 1695, del 1, sid. 898–1207; 1698, del 2, fols. 2914–3281; 1699, del 2, fols. 2838–3161; 1700, del 2, fols. 3222–3456.

¹⁰⁰ For a survey of the local economy, see ERKKI KUUSJO: *Raja-Karjala Ruotsin vallan aikana* [The Karelian Frontier under Swedish Rule], Helsinki 1963.

relian tar trade away from Viborg thanks to the more favorable rates of customs duty. A timber industry developed in the Neva valley during the last quarter of the century and stimulated, among other things, the construction of Nyen's own merchant navy.¹⁰¹

In the second half of the century, Nyen became an important competitor to its neighbors in non-Russian trade. Viborg's tar exports to the Netherlands, the city's main trade partner, exceeded those of Nyen severalfold until the 1680s, when Nyen's share temporarily rose to some one-third of the total for Viborg and the neighboring Finnish ports. In timber, Narva was the only competitor and somewhat ahead of Nyen in the 1680s and '90s.¹⁰² Nyen's combined grain exports of 1041 lasts in 1641 compared to some 2700 exported by Reval in 1641/2. By 1679, Nyen's exports reached some 1233 lasts, compared to 11 023 lasts in Reval (excluding domestic trade). Clearly, Nyen's grain exports eventually failed to match Reval's by far. They were, however, largely comparable with Narva's 1679 exports of 1710 lasts.¹⁰³

The 1679 Nyen customs book highlights the contrast between Nyen's Muscovite and domestic hinterlands. The main exports of the Russian boatmen consisted of 2300 S# hemp, 460 S# tallow, 10880 *iufiti*, as well as 2173 other hides. The same goods were sold to much smaller quantities to non-Russian vessels: 414 S# hemp, 60 S# tallow, and 1654 hides, of them only 377 *iufiti*. Instead, the dominant export category was grain (3100 lasts), as well as tar, butter, fish, and other mainly locally produced agricultural goods. In value terms, grain accounted for over a third of Nyen's exports in 1661 and was roughly equal in value to Nyen's combined fur, hide, and fiber exports. In 1662, the share of grain was 27 percent. The share of predominantly Russian categories was 31 percent.¹⁰⁴ While accurate *daler*-denominated data is not available on the rest of the century, it seems fair to assume that Nyen's was a tale of two cities, both more or less equally important and both going through a robust expansion during the final decades of the century. The surviving *Portorium* data for 1687–96 indicates that the duties paid by the Russian boatmen roughly equaled those exacted from all other merchants, thus suggesting that the share of Russian goods was 50–60 percent of the total, even if year-to-year variations could be quite significant (Table 1). The dichotomy in Nyen's export trade was underscored by the fact that trade in Russian goods was virtually

¹⁰¹ SVEN-ERIK ÅSTRÖM: *Holländarna och trävaruexporten från Finska Vikens hamnar kring 1700* [The Dutch and Timber Exports from Ports of the Gulf of Finland around 1700], in: *Historiska och litteraturhistoriska studier*, Svenska literatursällskapet i Finland 51 (1976), pp. 55–80.

¹⁰² RUUTH and HALILA (cf. footnote 2), II, p. 141; ÅSTRÖM (cf. footnote 101), pp. 57.

¹⁰³ SOOM (cf. footnote 49), pp. 27, 51.

¹⁰⁴ *Svensk handelsstatistik 1637–1737: samtida bearbetningar* [Swedish Trade Statistics 1637–1737: Contemporary Renditions], ed. by B. BOËTHIUS and E. HECKSCHER, Stockholm 1938, pp. 123, 133.

completely concentrated in the hands of the Russian boatmen of the Stockholm route, whereas Swedish and Western European ships came to carry almost exclusively Swedish goods.

Overall, Nyen's export trade closely mirrored the evolution of the other Swedish Baltic ports, especially Narva. Nyen rose from rather modest beginnings and indeed stagnated for at least a decade following its incorporation. However, it received a powerful impetus from the "first Baltic boom" of the late 1640s and early '50s. Trade rose to unprecedented levels and the city on the Neva established itself as an important and natural exit point for Russian exports. Another period of stagnation ensued during and after the Second Northern War until the Kardis Treaty of 1661 once again led to a steady expansion in trade, a trend that was not checked until the outbreak of the Great Northern War.

Table 1. Estimates of Nyen's Russian trade in the 1690s

Year	Total number of departures	Estimated number of departures by Russians	Total duty payments, Rd*	Duty payments by Russians, Rd	Estimated value of total exports, Rd
1687	62	29	952:45	620:39	95200
1688	90	27	1560:20	677:55	156000
1689	64	26	1054:38	528:72	105400
1690	88	34	1387:51	638:24	138700
1691	98	39	1371:21.13	762:42.3	137100
1692	78	34	1177:27	636:6.7	117700
1693	74	22	1303:12.5	523:72	130300
1694	84	29	1509:61	718:26.1	150900
1695	78	34	1316:9.33	690:47.4	131600
1696	75	28	1501:21.75	656:56.2	150100

* One-half of the *Portorium* payments.

(Source: KARA Kexholms och Ingermanlands läns verifikationsböcker, 9755, fols. 2568–77; 9759, fols. 2071–81; 9763, fols. 2133–7; 9767, fols. 2068–72; 9771, fols. 2565–70; 9775, fols. 1933–41; 9779, fols. 1947–51; 9783, fols. 2107–14; 9787, fols. 2092–3; 9791, fols. 2186–70)

Conclusions

This discussion has revealed that the four main Swedish Baltic ports depended on their Muscovite hinterlands to very different degrees. In Narva's case the dependency was nearly total and a collapse in Russian trade, as in the 1610s and '20s, entailed a severe economic crisis. In Nyen's case the share of Russian

goods, due to the growing significance of the Stockholm route, was roughly one-half of the total. In Reval's case, Muscovite exports since the 1620s were seldom more than one-fifth to one-quarter of the total, a very significant proportion and an important focus of the city's commercial policy. Nonetheless, the economic fortunes of the Estonian capital were more directly related to local grain production. This caused the city's precipitous decline in the runup to the Great Northern War.¹⁰³ Riga, for much of the century, only obtained at best five percent of its exports from the Muscovite hinterland, although this share rose significantly towards the end of the Swedish period and may have approached 15 percent in the 1690s. Moreover, as the discussion has shown, there were important commodities, much sought after by the great naval powers of the era, where the proportion was at times higher.

Narva, not surprisingly, was the most important Swedish port involved in Muscovite trade and regularly accounted for at least 50 percent of total Russian transit trade via the Baltic provinces. It was followed by Nyen, whose relative weight, especially on the Nyen-Stockholm axis, rose significantly towards the end of the century. The fragmentary customs data for the end of the century makes it difficult to assess Nyen's proportion precisely but it may well have exceeded one-third of the total. The last position almost certainly belonged to Riga for much of the century, although the growing imports from the Smolensk region eventually allowed Riga to eclipse Reval in the second half of the century.

Taken together, however, the Baltic ports of the Swedish Kingdom played an important and greatly underappreciated role in Russian foreign trade in the 17th century. At the beginning of the century, their combined exports probably amounted to some two-thirds of Arkhangel'sk's export trade. This proportion fell during the Time of Troubles and probably stayed below one-third of total Russian foreign trade until the 1640s. At this point, a robust recovery was eventually accompanied by problems at the White Sea and took the Baltic share once again to at least one-half of Russian export trade. The Second Northern War once again depressed the Baltic share to some one-third. However, the expansion of the last third of the century increasingly upset the traditional division and eventually took the Baltic share close to one-half of a steadily growing total.

¹⁰³ LIIv (cf. footnote 68).

Summary

The Significance of Russian Transit Trade for the Swedish Eastern Baltic Ports in the Seventeenth Century

This article examines the evolution of Russian transit trade through the Swedish Baltic ports of Riga, Reval, Narva, and Nyen in the 17th century. In addition to determining the scale of Russian exports, it establishes to what degree these Swedish-controlled ports depended on Russian goods. This study is inspired by the central importance given to Russian transit trade in Swedish economic policy: one of the main goals of Swedish mercantilism was to divert Russian trade from the White Sea port of Arkhangel'sk to the Eastern Baltic. The article demonstrates that the Swedish policy of diversion produced mixed results in the first half of the century. However, a combination of liberal policies in Sweden and a steady expansion of northwestern Russia resulted in a dramatic sustained expansion after the 1661 Kardis Peace. In most key commodities, Sweden came to pose a serious challenge to the Russian policy of favoring Arkhangel'sk. Nowhere was this success more evident than in Narva, whose export trade consisted almost entirely of Russian goods. Also the Neva port of Nyen, created by the Swedes in 1611, established itself as an important center of Russian trade as the Nyen-Stockholm route became the only venue of active foreign trade by Russians at the time. Riga and Reval were much less dependent on Russian trade. Towards the end of the century, Riga saw a substantial increase in its trade, especially with the Smolensk region. In Reval's case, attempts to regain the city's former role in Russian trade depended very heavily on largely unsuccessful attempts to enforce legal privileges vis-à-vis Narva.